Privacy Policy — Kinfara (family-safety app)
Kinfara Labs LLC ("we," "us") · Effective: 2026-09-17 · Last updated: 2026-09-17
This policy covers the Kinfara family-safety app (location, SOS, and on-device distress detection — see §5A "Listening for danger").
1. Our privacy commitments (at a glance)
We built this app so the data that could be abused doesn't exist to abuse. These are binding commitments, not slogans: 1. We do not sell, rent, license, or trade your personal information, and we do not "share" it for cross-context behavioral advertising. We do not disclose location or any data to data brokers, ad networks, or analytics-monetization partners — and never have. 2. Your location is visible only to the family-circle members you consent to, each of whom you can remove at any time. 3. We use precise location solely to provide the safety service you requested — never for any secondary or commercial purpose. (We bind ourselves to the FTC "sensitive location data" standard: a direct relationship with you, your affirmative opt-in, and use only for the requested service.) 4. No third-party advertising SDKs and no behavioral-analytics trackers are in the app. 5. We encrypt data in transit and at rest, use end-to-end encryption where feasible, and minimize what we hold. 6. We apply a sensitive-location safeguard: Kinfara does not intentionally build, infer, sell, or disclose a record of visits to sensitive places (health facilities, places of worship, etc.). The one exception is under your control: when a family member chooses to draw a real map, the parent's phone asks the map provider for the tiles around your child's position, which reveals that approximate area to the provider (see Section 15 — you can choose the position-only view instead, and then no map provider is contacted).
2. Who we are (data controller)
The controller is Kinfara Labs LLC, 300 Delaware Ave, Ste 210 #250, Wilmington, DE 19801, USA. Telephone: +1 645 249 0808. Email: privacy@kinfara.com. Our privacy contact details are in §17.
3. Information we collect
| Category | Examples | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Account & profile | name/label, email, family-circle membership, pairing codes | you |
| Precise location | live position, accuracy, recent trail/history (per §9), battery, mock-GPS flag | the protected person's device, with consent |
| Places & geofences | home/school/work zones you define | you |
| Safety-event data | SOS triggers, timestamps, the alert recipients you chose | your device, when an event occurs |
| Device & diagnostic | device type/OS, app version, internal device identifiers, usage counters for first open, onboarding done, and consent accepted under a random install identifier (no crash data is collected and no crash-reporting tool is in the app) | automatically |
| Push-notification token | a token issued by your phone's push service (Google's Firebase Cloud Messaging, or Apple's push service) that lets us deliver a safety alert to your phone. It identifies the app on your device, not you personally, and is used only to send you the alerts you asked for. Only the parent app registers a push token; the child's companion app does not. | your device's operating system, when you allow notifications |
| Age signal (from your app store) | if your app store offers it and you allow it, the store shares an age range (under 13 / 13–15 / 16–17 / 18+), a store-provided per-install identifier, and whether that range recently changed. We use it only to apply the correct age-based protections and parental-consent rules required by law (e.g. Texas, Utah, Alabama, California). We do not receive your date of birth, and a store answer never widens a protection. | your app store (Google Play today; Apple when available), only if you allow it |
| Personalization | the avatar, status and app theme a family member picks, stored as small preset choices and shown to your family circle | you |
| Children's data | a minor's location and profile, collected only under verifiable parental consent | parent/guardian (see §7) |
| Distress-detection sound | analyzed on your device only, in real time, then discarded — no audio, recording, or transcript is ever created (see §5A) | your device, only while you switch listening on |
| Secret phrase (typed) | if you set up a secret phrase: the words you type, their language, and a list of speech sounds looked up for those words in a built-in dictionary (not created from enrollment recordings — you never record anything, and no voice template, voiceprint, or other biometric identifier is created or retained). Kept on your device only, in its secure hardware storage — never uploaded, never backed up, never transferred to another phone. We never receive it. (see §5A) | your device, only if you set up a secret phrase |
We do not read your messages, social media, photos, or web history. Kinfara does use the microphone for one purpose only — to listen, on your device, for signs you need help — and the "Listening for danger" section (§5A) explains exactly how, including that no audio is ever recorded, stored, or sent.
3A. If you join our website waitlist
Before the app is something you install, you can ask to be told when it launches by giving us your email on our website (kinfara.com). This is separate from the app and from any family account.
What we collect when you join: the email address (and first name, if you give one) you type; and, worked out automatically from your connection when you submit the form, your approximate location (country, region or city, and time zone), your internet provider or network and its network number (ASN), whether that network looks like a VPN or data center, your IP address, the browser/device string (user-agent) your browser sends, the page that referred you, and a basic deliverability check on your email address. We use this only to run the waitlist, to gauge interest, to guard against fake or abusive sign-ups, and to email you about the launch.
Who processes it: the form is served and the connection details are added by Cloudflare (our website host and edge network); the entry is stored by Supabase (our database host, in the EU); and the confirmation and launch emails are sent by Resend (our email provider). Each acts only on our instructions — see §15.
How long we keep it: waitlist entries are deleted automatically within 12 months. You can ask us to remove yours sooner, or unsubscribe from the emails, at privacy@kinfara.com.
3B. Cookies and Do Not Track (our website)
We keep our website deliberately light. We do not use advertising cookies, and we do not use third-party analytics or tracking cookies. We use only the small amount of browser storage a site needs to work — for example, to keep you signed in on your account pages. We do not track you across other websites or services.
Because we do not track you across sites, a browser "Do Not Track" (DNT) signal or a Global Privacy Control (GPC) signal does not change what we collect — we already do not sell, share, or track. Where an opt-out of sale or sharing applies, we honor GPC.
4. Why we may process your data
- Your consent — location sharing, geofencing, and optional features; for a child under 13, verifiable parental consent under COPPA.
- To provide the service — operating the core account and safety service you signed up for.
- In an emergency — acting on an SOS alert to protect someone’s life or safety.
- Our legitimate business needs — security, fraud-prevention, and service integrity (not used for children's location).
5. How we use information
Solely to: show consented family members' locations; deliver geofence, arrival/leave, low-battery and stayed-too-long alerts; raise and escalate SOS alerts to the contacts you chose; operate, secure, and support the Services; and comply with law. We do not use your information for advertising, profiling, or monetization.
An honest limit on place-based alerts (geofence, "left/arrived", "stayed too long"). Because your location is encrypted and our server cannot read it, the zones you define (home/school/work) are checked on a family member's device — in the parent app — not on our server. A practical consequence, stated plainly: these place-based alerts are produced while the Kinfara app is running on the relevant phone (in the foreground, or active in the background) — not by an always-on server that watches your family's location for you, because by design it cannot. If the app is fully closed or the operating system has suspended it, a place-based alert may be delayed until it runs again. Your SOS button and safe-phrase detection run in Kinfara's always-on, on-device monitoring — they do not wait for our server and are designed to keep working while Kinfara runs in the background. Because they also run on the phone, they likewise require that monitoring to be active: if the app is force-closed or the operating system stops the monitoring, detection pauses until it runs again.
5A. Listening for danger — how sound is handled (on-device only)
In short: Kinfara listens for danger, not for you. No recording, transcript, voice template, voiceprint, or other biometric identifier is created, retained, or sent, and your voice never leaves your phone.
We built Kinfara to be there in an emergency — including when someone can't reach their phone to press a button. If you turn on distress detection, Kinfara listens for a scream and — if you set one up — a secret phrase that you type (currently English or Spanish), and can automatically raise an SOS to your family. We do not hide this and we never listen silently: while listening is on, a clear, persistent notification ("Kinfara is on — Listening for distress sounds") stays on the phone so you can always see it is active, and it changes to say so when the app is not able to listen.
Here is exactly how it works:
- Listening happens on your device, and the sound is thrown away. While distress detection is on, sound is analyzed in real time, in temporary memory, in short rolling windows that are each processed and immediately discarded — every working buffer is wiped after every check. That ambient sound is never recorded, saved, or sent — not to us, not to anyone, and not to any cloud backup. No recording, transcript, or other stored copy of it is ever created.
- Your secret phrase is typed, not recorded. You choose your phrase by typing it on the phone. The app then looks up how those words are pronounced in a built-in dictionary — the way a dictionary shows pronunciation — and keeps that list of speech sounds next to the words you typed. Nothing is made from your voice: you never record the phrase, and the app never builds a voice template, a voiceprint, or any other biometric identifier. What is stored is only the words you typed, their language, that dictionary-derived list of sounds, and a few technical settings.
- That phrase record stays on your phone. This is enforced in the app, not just promised. It is held in the device's hardware-backed secure storage (Android Keystore / iOS Keychain). The app contains no code that uploads it, and the app is configured so the operating system cannot include it in a cloud backup or copy it to a new phone during device transfer. It is never sent to Kinfara, to our servers, or to any third party. We could not hand it over if we were asked, because we never receive it.
- How recognition works — and who can trigger it. The phone compares the sounds it hears with the list of speech sounds for your phrase. It is not designed to recognize who is speaking: anyone who clearly says the phrase can trigger help, because in an emergency a "who is this?" check could cost someone their safety. It listens only for the phrase and for screams — not for conversation — and nothing it hears is written down, whether it matched or not.
- Only a safety alert leaves your device — never the sound. When a trigger is detected, the only thing sent is the SOS event you already authorized — that a trigger happened, and when — to the family members you chose, together with the encrypted location you already share (§5B). No sound, score, transcript, or copy of your phrase is sent. Your voice never leaves the phone.
- You control it, and you can see when it's on. Distress detection is off until you switch it on, and you can turn it off any time. On a child's phone, a typed secret phrase cannot be armed until the parent has enabled it from the parent app and the child sees, before the phrase is armed, exactly what will happen when the phone hears it. Turning that parent permission off deletes the phrase record at the phone's next check and prevents a new phrase from being armed. On a senior or adult-in-care phone, only with that person's own consent on their own device.
- Removing your phrase. Your phrase record is deleted when you remove it yourself (there is a "Remove phrase" button on the secret-phrase screen, with a confirmation), or when you erase the phone's data or uninstall the app — at which point it is destroyed along with the device's other protected data. The app verifies the deletion by reading the record back and confirming it is gone.
- People nearby. Because nothing is recorded and no one is identified by voice, sound from people around you is handled the same way — analyzed in the moment, then gone.
- Consent, and the people around you. Because Kinfara does not record, store, or transmit any sound — it analyzes short moments in temporary memory and immediately discards them, and never creates a recording, transcript, or copy — no audio of you, or of anyone near you, is ever captured or kept. We designed it this way partly so that turning on distress detection does not create a recording of other people.
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No biometrics — our legal position. Kinfara does not collect, capture, store, or use a biometric identifier or biometric information as those terms are defined by Illinois BIPA (740 ILCS 14), Texas CUBI, Washington RCW 19.375, or the biometric-data provisions of US state privacy laws. The typed secret phrase creates no voiceprint or voice template (see above).
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When listening pauses — the honest limits. No phone app can hear at every moment, and we would rather tell you exactly when Kinfara cannot than let you assume otherwise. During a phone call, the operating system silences every other app's microphone — including ours — for the whole call. The same can occur for short periods when another app is using the microphone (for example the voice assistant, or the child recording a video). And if the listening process itself is ever interrupted, restarting it can take up to roughly 25 seconds in the worst case. Kinfara detects these gaps, keeps a local log of them, and shows an honest "can't hear right now" status rather than pretending to listen; where the system allows it, listening resumes automatically the moment the microphone is free. Most phone-based safety products have these same limits — we are simply the ones telling you.
5B. Location encryption, our access limits, and security
(a) End-to-end encryption and access limits. Kinfara uses end-to-end encryption to secure your live location. Your location is encrypted on your device before it is transmitted and can be decrypted only by the devices of the people you have explicitly authorized (your family circle). Kinfara does not generate, hold, or have access to the private decryption keys required to view your location. Consequently, Kinfara cannot decrypt, view, or reconstruct your live location — we store only unreadable encrypted data — and we cannot provide your live location to any third party, including in response to a legal request, because we do not hold the keys.
(b) No sale or unauthorized sharing. We do not sell, rent, license, or share your location data with advertisers, data brokers, or any other unauthorized third party. It is used solely to provide the sharing features you enable, to the family you choose.
(c) Security disclaimer. We implement strong, industry-standard administrative, technical, and physical safeguards (including encryption in transit and at rest) designed to protect your information. However, no method of transmission over the Internet, and no method of electronic storage, is 100% secure. While we use commercially reasonable, modern cryptographic means to protect your data, we cannot and do not guarantee its absolute security, and we make no representation or warranty that the Services are invulnerable to unauthorized access. You share your location through the Services with people you know and trust, at your own risk.
(d) What we can see: connection metadata, not your content. End-to-end
encryption protects your content — your locations and the real names you give
family members. To operate the service, our servers do
process a small amount of metadata that is not encrypted: whether a device is
currently online, its battery level, the timestamps of check-ins (including when a
phone goes silent), the device platform, the small preset choices a member picks (an avatar, an app theme, and a coarse status label such as "At school" or "Home"), and a random routing codename (e.g.
kin1) that our servers use only for routing. The real name you give a family
member is encrypted (stored as ciphertext we cannot read); the codename is a random
tag, not that real name. Two precise details: the title of a safety alert about
an adult member (a parent, co-parent or trusted adult) and the connection records
kept for any member's phone carry that member's codename (for example
"kin3 pressed SOS"), never the name you typed, for as long as those alerts and records
are kept (§9); a safety alert about a child carries neither a codename nor a name —
it says "your child". This metadata is what lets the app tell you a phone went offline
or is running low on battery. It does not contain your location or your real names. Being honest about its limits: over time, connection metadata such
as check-in timestamps and online/offline status can indicate coarse
patterns — for example, roughly when a device is usually active — even though it
never reveals where anyone is. That is why we minimize this metadata and use
it only to operate the safety service — never for advertising, profiling, or
sale. So "we cannot read your data" refers to your content (locations and real
names); it does not mean we are blind to the fact that a device exists
or is currently connected.
5C. No setup download
The app needs no separate download after installation: everything the secret-phrase feature uses is inside the app you installed from the store, and nothing voice-related is fetched later.
6. How we share — and our "no sale" commitment
We share personal information only with: - Family-circle members you consent to (the core function); - Service providers / processors acting on our instructions, listed at Section 15 of this policy (e.g., cloud hosting, maps, and push) — each contractually barred from using your data for their own purposes; - Emergency contacts / responders, and only when you trigger or confirm an alert; - Legal disclosures where required by valid law; and a business transfer (merger/acquisition), with notice.
We do not sell or "share" your personal information as those terms are defined under the CCPA/CPRA, and we do not disclose it to data brokers or advertising networks. We honor Global Privacy Control signals.
7. Children's privacy
The family app is for consensual parent↔child family safety only (never covert or adult-on-adult monitoring). - How we get a parent's consent — and exactly what it costs. For a child under 13, US law (COPPA) requires us to obtain verifiable parental consent before we collect anything from the child's phone. Our method is a non-refundable $1 charge to a payment card (it pays for the verification and is kept, not held): after you add a child, we email you a direct notice describing what we would collect and why, with a link to a verification page run by Stripe. On that page you see the exact amount before you pay. The charge confirms that the person consenting has a payment card in their name. No full card number or security code reaches Kinfara; we receive only a payment reference, the card's last four digits and its brand, which we keep as proof of consent. A chargeback of that $1 withdraws your consent: we stop collecting and delete your child's information. If you do not complete the verification within 14 days, the child you added is removed and the details recorded for the request are deleted automatically. For a child aged 13 to 17, we obtain your consent by email with a confirmation step ("email-plus"), and your teen also opts in on their own phone. We never accept consent from a school, from a co-parent who is not the verified parent, or from an app store on your behalf. - Review, revoke, delete — how, and how fast. At any time you can, in the parent app, open your child and choose Export (a copy of everything we hold for that child, delivered only to the destination you pick in your phone's share sheet) or Delete & erase data (collection stops and we erase what we hold for that child); or write to children-privacy@kinfara.com from the email on your account. Deleting your child or your account withdraws consent. We complete deletion on our servers within 30 days of your request. Your child can also stop collection themselves — by turning off their own "Share my location" switch, or by choosing "Erase this phone's data" on their phone. - Proof-of-consent record we keep after deletion. COPPA requires us to be able to demonstrate that we obtained verifiable parental consent. To meet that, we retain a minimal consent record — the parent's email address together with the consent details (the policy version consented to, the verification method, and the date) — even after you delete your child's data or your account. We keep it only to prove and defend that consent to a regulator or in a dispute; it is stored in an access-restricted record, is never used for any other purpose, is never sold or shared, and does not include your child's location, messages, or the secret phrase (those remain end-to-end encrypted and are deleted). This is the single, narrow exception to our deletion promise. We do not keep this record forever. We retain it only for as long as we may be required to demonstrate that consent was validly obtained — the period during which a claim, dispute, or regulatory action about that consent could still be brought — and then we delete it. - We do not show advertising to, profile, or apply third-party analytics to minors. - The app surfaces a clear, persistent indication on the child's device that location is being shared, and a "Who can see me" list the child can open at any time. That list shows each viewer by role — "Account holder", "Co-parent", or "Trusted adult" — and the date they joined. It never shows a viewer's name, email address, or any other personal detail about that adult.
8. Sensitive-location safeguard
Precise geolocation is treated as sensitive (CPRA "sensitive personal information," and sensitive data under other US state privacy laws). We minimize its collection, use it only for the requested safety purpose, and maintain a sensitive-location program: we do not build, infer, retain for analytics, sell, or disclose records of visits to sensitive places (e.g., health facilities, places of worship, shelters).
Consumer-health-data laws (Washington, Nevada, and others). Some states treat data that could reveal a person's health as "consumer health data." Kinfara is a location-safety app: we do not ask for or infer health conditions, and the sensitive-location safeguard above means we do not build, infer, or keep records of visits to health-care facilities. We do not use geofences to identify or track visits to health-care facilities — the only location zones in the app are the ones a parent draws for their own family (for example "Home" or "School"), created and evaluated on the parent's own phone. Where a state's consumer-health-data law applies to any data we handle, our separate Consumer Health Data Privacy Notice governs that data and describes your rights, including consent and deletion.
9. Data retention
This section is written to satisfy COPPA 16 CFR §312.10, which requires a published policy stating, per category: the purpose it was collected for, the business need for keeping it, and a timeframe for deletion. Children's information is never kept indefinitely.
| Data | Why we collect it | Why we keep it at all | Deleted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Live location (encrypted) | To show the family the current position they asked to see | The current position answers "where are they now?"; the recent ones are what an emergency is reconstructed from | Up to 24 hours, then deleted by a nightly purge. The newest position of each phone is kept so the family can see where they were last, and it is deleted when that child or phone is removed or the account is deleted. Every position is encrypted to your family's key — we cannot read any of it. |
| Location trail / history | So a parent can see where their child has been today | The trail you actually look at is built on your own phone — our servers are not asked for it | On your phone: held within your plan's window (Basic 2 days / Premium 7 / Premium Plus 30), capped on-device at 30 days / 5,000 points per child, purged nightly and erased on sign-out or account deletion. On our servers: a rolling ~24-hour buffer of encrypted positions, purged nightly. ⚠️ Why we keep 24 hours rather than nothing. When an SOS alert fires, the answer a family needs is "where were they in the hours around it?" — and the parent's phone may have been off, offline, or the app closed, so it recorded nothing. That 24-hour buffer is the only place the emergency record can be cut from. We would rather tell you it exists than have nothing to give you on the worst day. It is encrypted to your family's key: we hold it, and we cannot open it. |
| Incident records (encrypted) — only when an SOS or safety alert actually fires | So the family can still answer "where was my child when the alarm went off?" — including when the parent's phone was off, offline or the app was closed, and therefore recorded nothing itself | The parent's own phone only records while it is running, and can hold nothing if it was off, offline or the app was closed. An emergency is exactly when that gap is likely, and exactly when the answer matters most. This is the narrowest keep we could design: nothing is kept unless an alert fires, and only the hours around it. | 90 days, then deleted automatically. Covers roughly a day either side of the alert. We cannot read any of it — it is encrypted to your family's key, which we do not hold. Only your family's devices can open it. |
| SOS / safety alerts | To deliver the emergency to the family and let them confirm it was handled | A parent must be able to see and acknowledge an alert they may have missed | 30 days, then deleted. An alert still unacknowledged is kept longer so an emergency nobody has seen is never silently discarded — but never beyond 90 days, after which it is deleted regardless. |
| Check-in / "I'm OK" messages | To let a family member tell everyone they are safe, and to show the parent that reassurance | A parent must be able to see a check-in they may have missed | 30 days, then deleted. A check-in nobody has acknowledged is kept longer so a message no one saw is never silently dropped — but never beyond 90 days, after which it is deleted regardless. A check-in carries only who checked in and when — no location. |
| Connection & presence metadata — a device being online or offline, its battery level, "went offline"/"reconnected" notices, and check-in timestamps | To tell the family a phone went offline or is running low on battery, so no one is left guessing in an emergency | The family needs to know a phone is reachable now, and a missed "went offline" notice must still be seen | The current-state values (online/offline, battery, latest timestamp) are overwritten as new readings arrive — no history is kept. The alerts these generate (for example "went offline" or "battery low") are kept with the other safety alerts: 30 days, an unacknowledged one up to 90 days, then deleted. This metadata never contains your location or your real names (see §5B). |
| Account & profile (name/label, email, family membership) | To create the family and route alerts to the right people | Needed for as long as the account exists | Until you delete your account, then within 30 days — except a minimal proof-of-consent record (your email + the consent version, method and date) we must keep to demonstrate verifiable parental consent under COPPA, retained in an access-restricted record and used only for that purpose (see §7). |
| Secret phrase (typed) record — the words, their language, and their dictionary speech sounds; no recording, no voice data | To recognize the child's chosen phrase | Kept so the child never has to type it again | Never leaves the device. Deleted (and the deletion verified) when the phrase is removed in the app, or when the phone's data is erased / the app is uninstalled. |
| Usage counters (first open, onboarding done, consent accepted — under a random install identifier; no crash data is collected and no crash-reporting tool is in the app) | To know the app works and where families stop | Short window to investigate a fault | 14 days, then deleted automatically, including events recorded before anyone signs in. Before deletion we keep only daily totals, which contain no install identifier, no account and nothing tied to a person or device. |
| Personalization — the avatar, on-screen status label, and app theme a family member picks | To show the family the look and status each member chose | Kept while the member is in the family so their choice persists | Stored as small preset choices on the account and deleted when that member, or the account, is deleted (within 30 days). They are fixed preset keys, not free text, and contain no location. |
| Alert-delivery receipts (internal log) | To confirm that an alert we promised to send was actually dispatched | So we can stand behind our safety promise and answer honestly if anyone ever asks "did the alert go out?" | 7 days, then deleted automatically (measured: the nightly purge runs purge_push_delivery_log(7)). Each receipt holds only an internal alert reference, your (the parent's) account id, a timestamp and a delivery status — no child name, no location, no voice, no message content. |
| Proof that you gave consent (which consent, which method, which policy version, and when) | To show, if a regulator asks, that we obtained a parent's permission before collecting anything from a child — as the law requires | We must be able to evidence compliance even after an account is gone | The parent's email address and the consent details are retained after account or child deletion solely to demonstrate verifiable parental consent, as described in Section 7. |
| Disconnected-child marker — only after a child erases their own data (see §13): the family slot with the child's name held encrypted (readable only on the parent's device, never by us) + the child's last-known location | So the parent is told their child disconnected and can see where they last were | It is the parent's own family record / parental awareness | Kept as the parent's record until the parent deletes the child or the account. The child's collected data (history, incident records, keys, consent, and settings) is erased at the moment the child chooses to erase. The minimal proof-of-consent record described in Section 7 is retained separately. |
We do not keep a long-term server-side history of where your child has been. The everyday trail is built and kept on the phones of the family members you authorized. Our servers hold only the encrypted rolling buffer described in the table above (a nightly purge keeps the last 24 hours, and we cannot read it) and the encrypted incident records created when an SOS or safety alert fires, for the periods stated in the table. This is deliberate.
The one exception, stated plainly: safety alerts. When an SOS or safety alert actually fires, we keep an encrypted record of roughly the day either side of it, for 90 days. We do this because your own phone only builds its trail while it is running — if it was off, out of signal, or the app was closed during the emergency, your phone recorded nothing for exactly the window you will want to ask about. We cannot read these records. They are encrypted to your family's key, which we never receive and cannot derive. Only your family's devices can open them. Nothing is kept unless an alert fires.
What that means for your right to see your child's information. Your everyday trail is on your own phone, so you already hold it: open the child's History screen to view it at any time, and export it from there. If you change or lose your phone, you can restore your family's key on a new phone with your 12-word recovery phrase — that is what the phrase is for, and it is also the only way to open the encrypted incident records described above. If you lose the 12 words, nobody can open them — not you, and not us. We cannot recover them for you; that is the direct trade-off for us never holding your key. Keep the phrase somewhere safe. Everything we do hold about your child, you can review, export and delete from the app or by writing to children-privacy@kinfara.com.
We delete or anonymize data as soon as it is no longer needed for the purpose it was collected for. Deletion is automated and monitored; if the automated deletion ever fails, we are alerted.
10. Security
Encryption in transit (TLS) and at rest; end-to-end encryption where feasible; access controls and least-privilege; secure development practices; and a breach-notification process: if we determine that a breach affecting your personal information has occurred, we will notify affected individuals and the appropriate authorities without unreasonable delay, and within the timeframe the applicable US state data-breach-notification law requires.
11. Where your data lives, and international transfers
Your family's data is stored in the European Union — specifically Frankfurt, Germany. That is true for every user, wherever you live. We chose it deliberately: EU data-protection law is the strictest widely-adopted standard, and holding everyone's data there means we meet it for everyone rather than only where we are forced to.
Where data is processed or accessed from another country (for example by a service provider or our staff), we require appropriate contractual and security safeguards for that transfer.
11A. Government and law-enforcement access — the honest version
We think you are entitled to the real answer here, not a comfortable one.
Kinfara Labs LLC is a United States company. Under US law — including the CLOUD Act — a US company can be ordered to produce data in its possession, custody, or control, even when that data is stored abroad. Storing your data in Germany does not, by itself, place it beyond the reach of a US legal order. Any company that tells you otherwise is overstating what hosting location achieves.
What actually protects your family is not geography — it is that we cannot read the most sensitive things you trust us with:
- Your child's location is end-to-end encrypted. We hold ciphertext. The keys live on your family's devices, not on our servers. If we were compelled to produce your child's location history, we would produce encrypted data we cannot decrypt — and we could not decrypt it for anyone else either.
- The secret-phrase record never leaves your child's phone, and it contains no voice data (the phrase is typed). We could not hand it over because we never receive it.
Our commitments if we receive a demand: 1. We will require valid legal process and refuse informal or voluntary requests. 2. We will challenge orders that are overbroad or legally defective, disclose only the minimum the law actually requires, and contest such orders rather than quietly comply. We intend to. 3. We will tell you unless a court forbids it — and where we are gagged, we will say so as soon as we lawfully can. 4. We will publish a transparency report covering the number of demands received and how we responded.
12. Your rights & choices
Depending on where you live you may have the right to know/access, correct, delete, obtain a portable copy, opt out of sale, sharing, targeted advertising and profiling, limit the use of sensitive personal information, withdraw consent, and appeal a decision we make on your request. We give the same rights to everyone in the United States, regardless of state, and we never discriminate against you for using them.
States whose privacy laws grant these rights (we honor them nationwide as a matter of policy): California (CCPA/CPRA), Colorado (CPA), Connecticut (CTDPA), Delaware (DPDPA), Florida (FDBR), Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland (MODPA), Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon (OCPA), Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas (TDPSA), Utah, and Virginia (VCDPA); with Oklahoma, Alabama, Louisiana, and Vermont as their laws take effect.
How to make a request. Email privacy@kinfara.com (children: children-privacy@kinfara.com) from the address on the account, or use the in-app controls (Settings → Privacy for export and account deletion; Family & sharing to remove a viewer; a child's own phone: "Erase this phone's data"). We may ask you to confirm a code sent to your email; we never ask for a government ID or a card number to verify a rights request. Authorized agents may submit a request with your written permission, and we may still confirm directly with you.
Timing. We respond within 45 days, extendable once by 45 days where the law allows, and we tell you if we extend.
Appeal. If we deny your request, you may appeal within 30 days by replying with "Appeal" in the subject line. A different person reviews the appeal and responds in writing within the window your state's law sets; if we still deny it, we give you the contact information for your state Attorney General (in California, the California Privacy Protection Agency).
"Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information" / "Limit the Use of My Sensitive Personal Information." We do not sell or share your personal information and have not done so in the past 12 months, and we do not use sensitive personal information for any purpose you can limit. You may still submit either request at privacy@kinfara.com, and we treat a Global Privacy Control (GPC) signal as a valid opt-out; we will confirm in writing.
13. Leaving, and deleting everything
You can leave at any time — whether or not you have accepted these Terms or this Privacy Policy, and for any reason, including that you no longer agree to them.
If you have not accepted yet: simply do not continue, and uninstall the app. Until you accept and set up a child, we have not collected anything from you to delete.
If you have set up your family: the single step that removes everything on our side is deleting your account (in the app: Settings → Delete account; or from the web page kinfara.com/delete-account, as Apple and Google require). Deleting your account wipes all of the family data we store — every child, their linked devices, and the encrypted location and safety-alert data — and removes your login itself.
- Because that location and alert data is encrypted to your family's key, which we never hold, once your account is gone it cannot be read by anyone.
- If you only want to remove one child rather than leave, open that child in the app and choose "Delete & erase data" — that erases what we hold for that child and stops any further collection, without closing your account.
Then uninstall the parent app to remove the family key and anything held on your phone.
On the child's (companion) phone, uninstall the companion app (or erase that phone's data). Its keys and the on-device secret-phrase record (the words your child typed and their dictionary sounds — there is no recording) are destroyed with it. We never received that record, so there is nothing on our side to delete.
If a child erases their data from within the app. A child can choose "delete & erase this phone's data" on their own phone. When they do, we erase the data we collected about them — their full location history, any safety-incident records, their encryption keys, and safety settings. The minimal proof-of-consent record described in Section 7 is retained separately and is not used for any other purpose. Two things are kept on the parent's side, as the family's own record: (a) the child's place in the family, with their name held in encrypted form that only the parent's device can read — never us, marked so the parent can see the child disconnected and erased their data; and (b) the child's last-known location, shown to the parent for awareness. The parent can remove even these at any time by deleting the child or the account.
Deletion windows, stated plainly. These are the timeframes our automated deletion actually runs on:
| What | When it is gone |
|---|---|
| Anything we hold about a child or an account, after you ask us to delete | Within 30 days of your request |
| A child you added but whose consent was never completed | 14 days after the child was added — removed automatically, with the request details |
| Location positions on our server (encrypted, unreadable to us) | Up to 24 hours of ordinary position history; the newest position of each phone is retained while that phone remains in the family and is deleted when that child or phone is removed or the account is deleted. |
| The encrypted record kept around a fired SOS or safety alert | 90 days after the alert |
| Safety alerts themselves | 30 days; an alert nobody acknowledged is kept up to 90 days, never longer |
| Microphone sound and the typed secret phrase | The sound is never stored. The phrase record never leaves the phone and is destroyed when you remove it, erase the phone's data or uninstall — the app checks the record is gone. |
The one thing that survives deletion is the parent's email address and the consent details (which method, which policy version, and when). We retain this minimal record solely because the law requires us to be able to show that consent was obtained. See the retention table in Section 9 for exactly what is deleted and when.
14. Privacy risk assessment
Because this app processes children's data and precise location with systematic monitoring, we are maintaining a written privacy risk assessment (a data protection impact assessment) and will complete and sign it before launch.
15. Third-party subprocessors
We use a deliberately small set of processors, each listed and kept current at Section 15 of this policy and contractually bound to use data only on our instructions. No advertising SDKs and no behavioral-analytics trackers are used — verified: the apps contain no Google Analytics, Firebase Analytics, Amplitude, Mixpanel, Segment, AppsFlyer, Meta SDK, Sentry or Crashlytics. Our own analytics are first-party and carry no coordinates, names or emails.
| Who | What reaches them | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Supabase — hosting | Encrypted location (ciphertext they cannot read), account email, family membership, device tokens, internal device identifiers | Runs the service. They store the ciphertext; they hold no key. |
| Cloudflare — website host & edge network | Website requests; for a waitlist sign-up, the connection details described in §3A (approximate location, network/ASN, VPN flag, IP address, user-agent) | Serves kinfara.com and adds the sign-up connection details. Not used by the apps. |
| Apple APNs / Google FCM — push | The alert that is being delivered, and the recipient device's push identity | Delivers safety alerts directly to the parent's phone. |
| TomTom, Carto, Esri (ArcGIS) — map tiles | See the note below | Draws the map (TomTom normally; Carto as a fallback basemap; Esri for the satellite view). |
| Resend — email delivery | Your (the parent's) email address and the text of the transactional email being sent (welcome, consent, invite, password-changed, device-takeover notices) | Sends the emails the service needs. Never a child's name or location. |
| Stripe — the $1 parental-consent charge, and subscriptions bought on kinfara.com | Your card details, entered on Stripe's own checkout page (they never touch our code or our servers); we receive only a payment reference, the card's last four digits and brand, and the time. We keep that reference as our proof of consent for as long as the consent record exists; the payment-evidence row itself is deleted after 540 days, the longest card-scheme chargeback window | Verifies that the person consenting for an under-13 child is an adult (COPPA "verifiable parental consent"). If you subscribe on our website, Stripe also processes that subscription: it renews automatically at the price shown until you cancel, and you can cancel in one click at kinfara.com/manage. |
🔴 The one you should read carefully — map tiles. To draw a map around your child, the parent's phone asks a map provider for the square tiles covering that area. Those requests reveal approximately where your child is (to tile precision — roughly a neighbourhood block at close zoom), along with the parent phone's IP address. This happens on the parent's device, not on our servers — we never send your child's position to a map provider, and we could not, because we cannot read it. But the request still leaves the phone.
This applies whenever the map is on screen: the live map, the location-history replay, and the screen where you set up Home and School zones — that last one reveals those places specifically.
Providers used: TomTom for every map style when our TomTom map key is available; when it is not, Carto serves the standard and dark styles and Esri (ArcGIS) serves the satellite and hybrid styles. The request identifies the app, not your account: no name, email, or account identifier is sent with it.
You choose whether this happens at all. When you first set up Kinfara — on the same screen where you give your consent, and before the app requests a single map tile — it asks whether to draw a real map or show your child's position without one. Neither option is preselected. If you choose position-only, nothing is sent to any map provider: you still see exactly where your child is, how far away and in which direction, how accurate the fix is, and how recent it is, all worked out on your own phone. You can change your mind at any time in Settings → Show a real map.
Because the screen where you mark home and school reveals those places specifically, it asks you a second, separate time before drawing a map there.
Tapping Navigate hands the coordinates to your phone's own maps app, which is a different company again — so that button names the app it will open (for example "Navigate · Google Maps").
No setup download. The app ships every detection component inside the app itself; there is no first-setup download of a voice engine (removed 2026-09-14, see §5C).
16. Changes to this policy
We will post updates with a new "Last updated" date and give prominent notice of material changes.
17. Contact
- Privacy / data requests: privacy@kinfara.com
- Children's privacy requests: children-privacy@kinfara.com
Kinfara Labs LLC is a US company serving the United States only.
- Complaints: California residents may contact the California Privacy Protection Agency or the California Attorney General; residents of other states may contact their state Attorney General.
Kinfara Labs LLC · 300 Delaware Ave, Ste 210 #250, Wilmington, DE 19801, USA · privacy@kinfara.com · Effective: 2026-09-17 · Privacy Policy · Terms of Use